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Abstract 
We show that, complementary to trade and financial linkages, the strength of the banking 
sector helps explain the transmission of currency crises. Specifically, we demonstrate that 
the Mexican, Thai, and Russian crises predominantly spread to countries with weaknesses in 
their banking sectors. At the same time, the role of banking sector strength varies per crisis; 
where the Mexican crisis spread to countries with a strong presence of foreign banks in 
domestic credit provision, the Thai crisis disproportionately contaminated countries where 
the banking sector was most sensitive to currency realignments, wh ile the Russian crisis 
spread to countries with inefficiencies in the banking sector. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Recent currency turbulences in, for example, Latin America and Asia have paved the way for 
a growing literature around the concept of contagion (e.g. Glick and Rose, 1999; Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). The aim of this literature is to 
increase our understanding of the diffusion of a shock affecting any particular “ground-zero” 
country to other countries. This entails , on the one hand, the identification of the relevant 
factors involved and, on the other hand, an assessment of the stability of their relative 
weights in the diffusion process.1 
The literature has so far identified trade and financial linkages as the two most 
important channels of crisis transmission, while fundamental macroeconomic variables play 
only a minor role (e.g. Glick and Rose, 1999; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). The role of 
trade linkages builds on the argument of competitive devaluation. If a specific country A 
realigns its exchange rate, then a particular country B suffers a loss in competitiveness in 
third markets where it competes with products from country A. Hence the shock that forced 
country A to realign its exchange rate may transmit to country B through trade competition 
in third markets. Glick and Rose (1999) find empirical support for the trade competition 
channel using data on five different currency crises.2 The role of financial linkages derives 
from the common bank lender effect, which builds on risk management techniques used by 
banks (e.g. Kaminsky and Reinhart, 2000; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). The common 
bank lender effect states that banks – when their exposures in a particular country are hit by 
a currency crisis – reduce investments in related markets, causing a credit crunch there. Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) find a clear common lender effect in the propagation of the 
Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises. 
As the main creditors tend to concentrate their loans in specific regions in the world, 
and trade linkages tend to be predominantly regional as well, both trade and financial 
linkages speak to the regional transmission of currency crises. An interesting identification 
problem naturally results; though separately trade and financial linkages perform well in 
explaining patterns of crisis transmission, taken together they substitute rather than 
complement each other. Furthermore, their explanatory power remains moderate at best, 
suggesting that other channels may also exist. 
                                        
1 One stream of the contagion literature avoids the issue of identifying the transmission channels and 
looks for an increase in the market linkages. This approach is generally referred to as shift contagion 
(e.g. Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Candelon et al., 2005). 
2 The crises are the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the collapse of the Smithsonian 
Agreement in 1973, the EMS crisis of 1992-93, the Mexican meltdown of 1994 and the Asian flu of 
1997. These results corroborate findings by for example Eichengreen et al. (1996), Kaminsky and 
Reinhart (2000), Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998). 
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Sbracia and Zaghini (2003) suggest that the specificities of banking activities 
generate several potential channels for the transmission of currency crises. In particular, 
maturity transformation may be at the origins of bank panics, illustrated by bank runs, 
leaving the banking system in search of liquidity. In a globally integrated banking sector, the 
liquidity crunch can be transmitted to other economies. Caramazza et al. (2000) and Herrero 
(1999), using different proxies3 to represent asset maturity transformation, find a 
propagation effect for Venezuela. To mitigate these problems, international financial 
authorities have set up rules to help banks in distress. As a by-product, however, this may 
introduce moral hazard behavior that in itself may foster contagion. Although the moral 
hazard phenomenon is empirically rather hard to measure, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 
(1998) use deposit insurance as a proxy and find some support that moral hazard may 
explain crisis contagion. 
Although several studies have begun to empirically analyze the role of the banking 
sector as a part entière channel of crisis transmission, a systematic analysis of the role of 
bank balance sheets (usually labeled banking sector quality or strength) as a factor of crisis 
transmission has yet to be performed. In this paper we take steps in that direction by paying 
closer attention to the financial channels that may help explain the transmission of crises. 
Specifically, we attempt to distinguish the role of banking sector strength from that of 
common lender effects as captured by financial linkages. As the nature of currency crises 
changes over time (Saxena, 2004), we find it conceivable that the nature of the transmission 
of crises changes over time. Accordingly, we analyze the transmission of the Mexican, Thai, 
and Russian crises separately. In line with previous studies, we find that the 1994 Mexican 
meltdown, as well as the 1997 Asian flu, was predominantly regionally transmitted via trade 
and financial linkages. The transmission of the 1998 Russian crisis, however, also ran via 
specific banking channels. This changing nature of crisis transmission may explain why the 
Russian crisis diffused relatively more across regions, whereas the Mexican and Thai crises 
remained largely regional.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. The next section provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the role of the banking sector in financial crisis transmission. Section 3 outlines 
the empirical strategy and the results are presented and discussed in section 4. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
 
                                        
3 They both introduce the ratio of broad money to international reserves and short-term debt to 
international reserves in order to represent the ability of the financial system to withstand currency 
pressures. 
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II. The Role of Banking Sector Strength in Crisis Contagion 
 
This paper argues that banking sector strength positively affects the extent to which 
countries can absorb external shocks. The analysis is in the spirit of Sachs et al. (1996) who 
argue in favour of a negative relationship between the strength of a country’s banking 
system and its vulnerability to contagion. In our view, a strong banking sector consists of 
banks that only grant loans on which the interest revenues cover all the risks that the 
banking sector is exposed to. That is, a strong banking system is comprised of banks that 
are able to correctly price the risks associated with the intermediation of funds such as asset 
transformation and maturity transformation.4 A strong banking system will thus limit the 
possibility of the transmission of a crisis by reducing transmission channels due to risk 
management and asset maturities transformation. This involves extensive monitoring and 
screening of debtors by banks and cumulates in the allocation of financial funds to their most 
efficient use. The ability of banks to correctly price risk is reflected in a low share of non-
performing loans and in high levels of profits, efficiency, capital, and liquidity. These factors, 
in turn, are positively related to the degree of confidence that markets have in the stability of 
the banking system. Confidence in the stability of the financial system is at the core of 
economic stability, vice versa.  
Krugman (1999) argues that the banking system does not have to be weak at the 
onset of a financial crisis. The weaknesses may arise in the course of a crisis from the 
balance sheet problems of debtors and/or from loss of investors’ confidence in the stability of 
the financial system. Notably, according to Krugman the bad loan problem is a consequence 
rather than the cause of a financial crisis. It has its origin in a transfer problem according to 
which a reversal in capital inflows necessitates a reversal in the current account balance from 
a deficit to a surplus. This reversal can be accomplished through a deliberately advocated 
recession or through an exchange rate devaluation. Indisputably , a fall in absorption and the 
corresponding economic downturn worsens the balance sheet position of debtors and 
weakens the banking system through its positive effect on the debt default rate. Banks are 
assumed to respond to the increase in the debt default rate by reducing the supply of loans. 
In restricting the private sector’s access to external funds, banks cause a credit crunch with 
detrimental effects on the performance of the economy. 
Krugman (1999) reasons that the problem of non-performing loans does not weaken 
the banking system per se if banks are re-capitalized. The bad loan problem only destabilizes 
                                        
4 Lindgren et al. (1996) stress low levels of profitability, cash and capitalization, high debt and a high 
responsiveness to changes in domestic and foreign interest rates as characterizing factors of a weak 
banking system. 
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the banking system if investors loose confidence regarding the stability of the banking 
system. The loss in confidence may arise from a currency devaluation, which is advocated to 
match the reversal of capital inflows. Similar to a fall in absorption, the real depreciation of 
the domestic currency worsens the balance sheet posit ion of firms and households by raising 
the real costs of holding loans denominated in foreign currency. This development, in turn, 
contributes to the weakness of the banking system by raising the loan default rate. 
Similar to Krugman (1999), Sachs et al. (1996) and Tornell (1999) stress a decline in 
absorption and currency devaluation as policies that can be engineered to cope with 
contagious effects of shocks originating in the ground zero country (hereafter simply, ground 
zero). More specifically, Sachs et al. (1996) emphasize that the choice of the appropriate 
policy crucially depends on the strength of the banking system at the start of a crisis period.5 
If the banking system is characterized by a high share of non-performing loans at the start 
of a cris is, an engineered recession amplifies the weakness of the banking system through its 
positive effect on the debt default rate. In anticipation of such an effect, Sachs et al. (1996) 
argue that a government will advocate currency devaluation rather than a fall in absorption 
to deal with contagious effects in the presence of a weak banking system. 
Sachs et al. (1996) and Tornell (1999) view bad loans as the outcome of periods of 
bank lending booms. These periods are associated with financial market liberalization; a 
development which comes along with poor mechanisms of prudential supervision and 
regulation.6 The process of financial market liberalization has two interrelated implications. 
Firstly, it increases the willingness and ability of banks to grant loans. Secondly, it improves 
the terms under which debtors can obtain funds from banks. These aspects, in addition to 
the lagging development of expertise, credit market imperfections, and institutional and 
policy deficiencies related to bank supervision and regulation imply that banks may not 
correctly price risk and may invest in risky and poorly performing projects. The credit 
expansion correspondingly increases the average share of bad loans and deteriorates the 
quality of the banks’ loan portfolios. This, in turn, increases the sensitivity of the – possibly 
undercapitalized – banking systems to reversals in capital inflows.  
The inability of banks to correctly price risk is reflected not only in the share of non-
performing loans, but also in the overall cost efficiency, profitability, and liquidity of the 
banking sector. These variables co-define the exposure of banks to shocks and determine 
their ability to absorb contagious effects and to accommodate bank runs. The level of bank 
liquidity at the onset of a foreign crisis matters as it may affect the confidence of depositors 
                                        
5 The models implicitly exclude the possibility that banks are re-capitalized. 
6 Corsetti et al. (1998) provides descriptive evidence of the role of excessive lending in a deregulated 
banking system as cause of the Asian crisis.  
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regarding the ability of banks to meet large withdrawals. Depositor confidence is a necessary 
– though not a sufficient – condition to avoid a run on deposits. In order to meet liquidity 
requirements in the face of large deposit withdrawals , the banks’ natural response is to curb 
lending. The contraction in loan supply has two interdependent effects. Firstly, the credit 
contraction comes at the expense of real economic activity through its negative effect on 
investment and consumption spending. Secondly, the credit crunch and the corresponding 
decline in economic activity worsen the balance sheet position of firms and households and 
raises the share of non-performing loans. These developments cause the quality of the 
overall loan portfolio to deteriorate and intensify the motive to run on deposits. The 
underlying effects are, therefore, self-reinforcing and cumulate in an unsound or insolvent 
banking system. 
DeYoung and Whalen (1994) argue that the share of non-performing loans decreases 
with the cost efficiency of banks. At the core of this relationship is the notion that efficient 
banks operate more stringent monitoring standards than inefficient banks. Assuming a direct 
positive link between the cost efficiency and profitability of banks, a virtuous circle may 
ensure that efficient banks can impose higher monitoring standards (i.e. can direct expenses 
foregone elsewhere to the screening and monitoring debtors). This reduces credit risk per se 
and helps to secure a stable stream of interest income. Furthermore, it adds to the overall 
level of capital, which implies that cost-efficient banks are better protected against adverse 
developments than cost-inefficient banks. These relationships also explain why a banking 
system consisting of efficient banks is likely to absorb shocks and consequent economic 
downturns better than one composed of inefficient banks. The reason is that efficient banks 
face fewer pressures to contract their loan supply in the presence of adverse economic 
developments or deposit withdrawals because they are more likely to meet capital adequacy 
requirements than inefficient banks. Furthermore, Fries et al. (2002) argue that efficient 
banks abstain from taking excessive risk if the probability of failure and the consequent loss 
of capital are high.7  
It follows from Peek and Rosengreen (2000) and De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) 
that the stability of the banking sector may also depend on the degree of foreign bank 
penetration. However, the nature of this relationship is not unambiguous.8 Foreign-owned 
banks can stabilize the performance of the domestic banking system if they are more 
efficient than domestic banks. Relative efficiency gains arise from cross-border diversification 
and the exploitation of associated cost-saving scope and/or scale economies. If effective, 
                                        
7 Fries et al. (2002) associate the loss of capital with the loss of the banking license. 
8 See De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) for a detailed survey of the positive and negative effects of 
foreign bank operation in domestic markets. 
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these gains cause the domestic credit provision by foreign-owned banks to be less sensitive 
to the exogenously determined changes in interest rate margins than credit supply by 
domestically owned banks. In being more stable, credit supply by foreign owned banks may 
limit the magnitude and frequency of lending booms. Since this also reduces the rate of loan 
default, the operation of foreign-owned banks is expected to stabilize the performance of the 
domestic banking system. Closely related to this argument, the geographical scope of activity 
enables foreign-owned banks to operate a loan portfolio that is more diversified and less 
susceptible to shocks and contagious effects than that of domestic banks. Foreign-owned 
banks may for that reason be viewed as ‘safe havens’ in the domestic banking market, which 
limits capital outflows during a financial crisis. The presence of foreign-owned banks can also 
directly stimulate the stability of the domestic banking system by providing access to new 
management techniques and information technologies. Foreign bank management practices 
and information technologies improve the quality and efficiency of banking services and 
lower the costs of funds intermediation. With credits becoming cheaper, the efficiency gains 
mitigate the severity of the loan default problem, thereby stabilizing the banking system. 
These positive effects on banking sector stability are amplified if it holds that foreign bank 
penetration has a positive impact on banking practices, regulation, and supervision.  
Under some circumstances, however, the presence of foreign-owned banks may also 
destabilize the domestic banking system. One argument in this regard stresses the effect of 
foreign bank penetration on the degree of short-run concentration of banks. The entry of 
foreign banks may reduce the degree of concentration of the banking sector. If domestic 
banks fail to adjust to the increased competitive pressures, the domestic banking sector is 
likely to be characterized by banking failures and, consequently, financial instability. Another 
argument is that foreign banks may also be least committed to a country, so that they may 
also be the first to cut their losses when the going gets tough.9 
In the empirical analysis of the role of banking sector strength in the transmission of 
currency crises we consider various proxies of the features of banking sector strength 
discusses so far. Detailed definitions and data sources are in the appendix. We now turn to 
the empirical implementation of crisis transmission analysis. 
 
III. Empirical Strategy 
 
We are primarily interested in the transmission of currency crises across countries (cf. Glick 
and Rose, 1999; Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). We therefore analyze why a crisis in 
                                        
9 De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2005) and Morgan et al. (2003) take a portfolio view of multinational 
banking to support such an argument. 
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ground zero transmits to some countries, but not to others. The present analysis considers 
the Latin American, Asian, and Russian crises. Following common patterns, the crisis 
episodes are correspondingly modeled to originate with Mexico (December 20, 1994), 
Thailand (July 2, 1997) and Russia (August 18, 1998).  We test for the existence of crisis 
contagion by estimating cross-section probit regressions. These measure the relative 
importance of banking variables as factors which affect the probability of observing a 
financial crisis in country i given a financial crisis in the ground zero country. To 
accommodate alternative channels of crisis contagion, we also control for trade and financial 
linkages as well as a score of miscellaneous macroeconomic controls. The probit model has 
the following form: 
 
(1) iiiiii BNKMCRFINTRDIND e+g+d+b+a= , 
 
where e i represents normally distributed error terms and subscript i is a country index with 
i = 1,…, N (number of countries). IND is the binary crisis indicator that equals unity if 
country i suffered a financial crisis after a crisis hit the ground zero country and zero 
otherwise.10 We use the crisis classifications as defined by Glick and Rose (1999) and Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) who distinguish crisis from non-crisis countries by using 
journalistic and academic histories and the views of IMF economists (see the appendix). The 
motivation for this choice of crisis indicator is to enable a comparison between our results 
and these influential papers. TRD and FIN are the proxy variables for trade and financial 
linkages. We control for trade linkages by including the measures of trade competition in 
third markets as defined by Glick and Rose (1999) and applied by Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (2001), among others. This measure of trade competition accounts for the degree to 
which any country competes with ground zero in foreign export markets. We control for 
financial linkages by considering the measure of funds competition as defined by Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). Funds competition measures the extent to which country i 
competes for bank loans from the same lenders as ground zero. Stronger competition for 
trade and finance with ground zero meanwhile also raises the sensitivity of a particular 
country to crisis contagion. MCR represents a set of macroeconomic control variables that 
are related to the external and internal balance of a country prior to the crisis in ground 
zero.11 These variables are included to account for disequilibria in macroeconomic 
                                        
10 On the right-hand side of the equation we include only information that predates the crisis to avoid 
endogeneity. 
11 Detailed descriptions of the trade, financial, and macroeconomic variables are in the appendix. 
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fundamentals, which may leave a country vulnerable to a currency crisis as distinct from 
trade and financial linkages. 
BNK denotes the set of variables related to banking sector strength. We follow Sachs 
et al. (1996) and Tornell (1999) and assume that the strength of the banking sector at the 
start of a crisis period determines the sensitivity of a country to shocks originating in the 
ground zero country. We select several measures of banking sector strength accordingly. 
These variables characterize the strength of the banking system by stressing the relative 
importance of non-performing loans and by emphasizing the risk exposure of banks as 
measured by liquidity, profitability and efficiency. Despite their theoretical motivation, the 
choice of variables is also restricted by the availability and quality of data and by the 
comparability of data across countries. The selected variables should therefore be viewed as 
approximations of the underlying features of banking sector strength.  
We use several variables to capture the strength of the banking sector as indicated 
by the degree of credit expansion. Rough measures of credit expansion are claims on the 
private sector and claims on the government and other public entities. These variables do 
not characterize the claim and do not distinguish the source of claim. More details are 
embedded in i.) domestic credit as provided by the banking sector (bank assets to GDP) and 
ii.) private credit as provided by deposit money banks (private credit by banks). Published by 
the Worldbank, these variables are expressed as a share of GDP.12 Besides these variables, 
the stability of the banking system is approximated as in Sachs et al. (1996) and Tornell 
(1999) with a lending boom index that reflects the speed of credit expansion. This index is 
computed as the real percentage change in loans that banks grant to the private sector and 
to state-owned enterprises over a four-year pre-crisis period. What all these measures of 
(excessive) bank credit expansion have in common is that for each country theoretically an 
increase in these measurements depicts a weakening in the banking sector, which may 
increase the probability that the crisis in ground zero spreads to this particular country.13 
As emphasized, the strength of the banking system is positively related to bank 
liquidity, efficiency, and profitability. Regarding liquidity, we look at the ratio of bank liquid 
reserves to bank assets, where high ratios typically reflect strong banks.14 We also use 
information on bank deposits as a share of GDP, which – given the maturity mismatch – also 
                                        
12 See www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm. The variables are compiled 
by using information from the IFS-IMF. 
13 This conclusion remains unchanged if we alternatively interpret the measures of (excessive) credit 
expansion as indicating the extent to which banks accommodate or propagate instable economic 
processes (like asset price bubbles). 
14 At the level of individual banks, excessive liquidity may indicate funding problems or other 
precautionary motives, thereby pointing to weakness rather than strength. At the level of a country’s 
banking sector we do not expect liquidity to pick up this effect though. 
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signals liquidity risks. Proxy variables of profitability are net interest rate margins and 
overhead costs. The net interest rate margin depicts the relative profitability of interest-
bearing assets and overhead costs represent the costs related to management and 
administration. While bank profitability and, accordingly, banking sector strength increases 
with net interest rate margins, it decreases with operating costs. Banking sector efficiency is 
approximated as the ratio of the interest rate margin over operating cost. The corresponding 
data are provided by the Worldbank.15  
Besides these factors, the stability of the banking system also depends on the degree 
of foreign bank penetration, albeit in an uncertain way. In order to test the importance of 
foreign bank penetration as a determinant of bank stability and as a possible transmission 
channel of contagious shocks, we follow De Haas and Van Lelyveld (2004) and define this 
variable as follows. Using BIS reporting countries’ data, the proxy variable is computed as 
the sum of cross-border claims in all currencies, local claims in non-local currencies, and local 
currency claims on local residents less cross-border claims with head offices outside the 
country. The result is divided by domestic credit as contained in the IFS. In order to 
conclude that foreign bank penetration stabilizes the domestic banking system, the resulting 
coefficient estimates should be negative, i.e. an increased presence of foreign banks in 
domestic credit provision should reduce the probability of a country being hit by contagion.16 
 
IV. Empirical Results 
 
The probit model is estimated on a cross-sectional dataset that consists of 48 emerging and 
developing countries.17  This is a somewhat smaller number of countries than included in the 
dataset used by for example Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), who also include a number 
of developed European and North American countries. However, we feel that including non-
emerging countries biases both the economic interpretation for emerging countries and the 
estimates (by raising the number of non-crisis observations relative to the number of crisis 
observations). The frequency of our data is annual, quarterly or monthly – depending on the 
specific variable – and covers the period 1993-1998. 
Macroeconomic data are collected from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
publication of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Our measure of trade competition is 
                                        
15 The data are compiled from the World Development Indicators (CD-Rom 2004) and from 
www.worldbank.org/research/projects/finstructure/database.htm. 
16 Alternatively, foreign bank penetration would need to reduce the contagious impact of financial 
linkages. We show shortly that such interaction effects have little if any statistical significance in our 
analysis. 
17 A complete overview of the countries included in the sample is given in the appendix. 
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built from annual data extracted from the IMF-International Trade Statistics. Competition for 
funds is computed from bi-yearly information on the consolidated banking activities by the 
Bank of International Settlements (BIS). To be more precise, the variable is constructed by 
considering aggregate bank loans from the BIS reporting countries to our sample countries.18 
Missing data causes differences in the number of countries for which the measure of trade 
and financial linkages is available in each of the sampled crisis episodes. Finally, data on the 
strength of the banking sector are compiled from the IFS and from the records of the World 
Bank. 
Equation (1) is estimated using the traditional maximum likelihood procedure for the 
Mexican, Asian, and Russian crises. We also report the z-statistics as well as the Mc-Fadden 
R-squared to judge the quality of the specification. In the first instance, we look at each 
variable separately to determine its role in the transmission of the crises in question (see the 
column headed ‘univariate’ in table 2). As in Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), the 
correlation matrix (table 1) reveals that the trade and funds competition, but also the various 
banking sector strength measures correlate quite strongly, which may lead to identification 
issues in the multivariate analysis. In addition to the univariate regressions, we assess for 
each variable in turn its explanatory power after controlling for trade and funds competition 
(see the column headed ‘multivariate’ in table 2). The comparison of these two experiments 
will indicate to what extent the bank sector strength measures augment the explanation of 
crisis transmission after controlling for what the literature by now considers the standard 
trade and finance channels. The results will be discussed more extensively  below. Secondly, 
a multivariate analysis is performed. All the banking measures that have explanatory power, 
in addition to trade and funds competition, are included in a general model. Then, following 
the general-to-specific approach, all the variables not significant at a 20% error level are 
sequentially removed, leading to the parsimonious models reported in table 3. The table 
additionally reports the model with trade and funds competition alone. In line with the 
literature in this field, we find that additional macroeconomic controls (real exchange rate 
changes, foreign exchange reserves, government budget and current account deficits and so 
on) have no additional explanatory power (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001), limiting 
the support of a fundamentals -based view of the transmission of the crises. By contrast, in 
the case of the transmission of the Russian crisis, we find that our measures of banking 
sector strength do add explanatory power after controlling for trade and financial linkages.19 
                                        
18 The BIS reporting countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Japan, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, United Kingdom, United States, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland. 
19 The McFadden R-squared jumps from 0.09 to 0.30 when measures of banking sector strength are 
taken on board. 
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From table 3 we also note that the explanatory power of our model (represented by the 
McFadden R-squared) is lower than that in Glick and Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem and 
Weder (2001). Such a result is inherent to the different sample we consider. As we exclude 
industrialized countries, the relative number of countries facing a currency cris is increases in 
our data set compared to the data sets used by Glick and Rose (1999) or Van Rijckeghem 
and Weder (2001), leading to a lower explanatory power. By focusing primarily on emerging 
economies, we face a more difficult task in separating those prone to contagion in any 
particular crisis. Yet at the same time we feel that any result will be far more powerful in 
understanding which countries, from a sample of countries that have demonstrated strong 
sensitivity to crisis contagion, are most at risk at any point in time. We now turn to a more 
detailed discussion of the results for each crisis separately. 
 
The Mexican crisis  
The Mexican crisis was spurred by a number of interacting factors related to regulatory 
deficiencies, credit growth, political uncertainty, and adverse external developments. In the 
course of the 1980s, Mexico experienced rapid economic growth that was induced by the 
liberalization of capital and trade flows. In the presence of a crawling pegged exchange rate 
system and low US interest rates, this development induced large capital inflows. At the 
same time, deregulation of the financial sector, a prosperous economic outlook, and a 
decline in public indebtedness triggered excessive credit growth. Given weak supervisory 
capacities by regulators, the absence of bank reserve requirements, the lack of expertise by 
undercapitalized financial institutions, and the consequent moral hazard problem, the lending 
boom deteriorates the quality of banks’ loan portfolios. Furthermore, in stimulating capital 
investment and private consumption, the credit boom contributed to the emergence of an 
external deficit. This was largely financed by short-term USD denominated capital and 
became increasingly unsustainable given imprudent investment. The financial crisis erupted 
in December 1994. 
 Tables 2 (panel A) and 3 gather the results of our investigation concerning the 
transmission of the Mexican crisis. Firstly we observe that individually, measures of banking 
sector strength (deposits by banks, lending boom, and foreign bank penetration) have 
significant explanatory power. Due to their correlation with trade and funds competition, 
however, only foreign bank penetration augments the multivariate model. It turns out that 
the transmission of the Mexican crisis  follows both trade and funds competition patterns. 
These results support a mixed view on the generation of the Mexican crisis. The trade 
channel supports a second-generation transmission of a currency crisis. Third generation 
models of currency crises also incorporate credit cycle models where the financial crisis 
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originates with the asset side of banks’ balance sheets (e.g. Breuer, 2004). This is in line 
with the observation that contaminated countries are more strongly in competition for funds 
with Mexico than the countries that remain unaffected by the contagious effects of the 
Mexican crisis. Hence, the crisis also tended to be transmitted via common lenders (cf. Van 
Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001; Sbracia and Zaghini, 2003). Additionally, some of our 
indicators of banking sector strength correlate with the crisis indicator, lending credence to 
the view that the transmission of the Mexican crisis was predominantly to countries that had 
recently experienced an overexpansion of bank credit (cf. Sachs et al., 1996; Tornell, 1999). 
Specifically, contaminated countries experienced a lending boom in the run-up to the tequila 
crisis and showed a larger share of bank assets to total financial assets.20 Interestingly, 
countries in which foreign banks had been more involved were also more likely to catch a 
tequila hangover, as indicated by the higher value of foreign bank penetration for the crisis 
countries.21 This result may suggest that foreign banks provide instability to our sample-
countries because they tend also to be the first ones to run when the going gets tough. 
However, foreign bank penetration may also reflect implicit or explicit guarantees on 
deposits provided by the host country. International banks have larger incentives to branch 
out to those host countries that provide some form of deposit insurance guarantees, rather 
than to hosts that do not. Deposit insurance guarantees create moral hazard on the part of 
the decisions of both local and international banks and may make the system as a whole 
vulnerable to shocks (cf. Sbracia and Zaghini, 2003). Alternatively, foreign bank penetration 
may reflect a high degree of financial openness and, as Kaminsky et al. (2003) point out, 
markets that are easily accessible and liquid are very sensitive to capital flight when hit by 
shocks. In addition to the variables reported in the table, we correlate a number of the more 
traditional macroeconomic control variables with the crisis index, such as GDP growth, the 
trade deficit, the budget deficit, interest rates, foreign exchange reserves, and the real 
exchange rate. None of these variables by themselves explain the transmission of the 
Mexican crisis. 
 
The Asian crisis  
A multitude of interdependent domestic and external factors are at the origin of the Asian 
crisis. The main cause of the East Asian crisis was a moral hazard problem at the corporate, 
                                        
20 In itself, a lending boom may point to a first-generation crisis, indicating an overall excessive 
growth in domestic credit. Our broader results suggest that it is the share of bank lending in total 
lending that drives our result. Moreover, unreported results show no signs of crisis countries running 
excessive budget deficits, the required closing piece of the first-generation view on currency crises. 
21 Interaction effects - defined as the product of foreign bank penetration and funds competition – 
turn out insignificant. Hence we cannot conclude that the Mexican crisis spreads to countries with a 
strong presence of foreign banks that also have large exposures in Mexico. 
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financial, and international level during the process of financial market liberalization in the 
1990s. Corsetti et al. (1998) attribute the moral hazard problem to structural and policy 
distortions in the corporate and financial sectors. Distortions at the corporate level arose 
from public guarantees to favored private sectors and from bailout policies that created an 
environment of certainty regarding the return on risky and financially unsound investment 
projects.  
Despite the low profitability of investment, investment rates in Asia were high. High 
investment was financed with credits from domestic financial institutions that borrowed 
heavily from abroad. The implications of these developments were twofold. Firstly, in lacking 
sound supervision, strong regulation, and transparency, the willingness of financial 
institutions to channel funds toward risky projects resulted in an undercapitalized financial 
system with a growing share of non-performing loans. Secondly, high investment rates 
stirred overheating pressures, inflated stock and real estate prices, and contributed to the 
emergence of current account deficits. The emergence of an external deficit was dangerous 
since the low profitability of the investment projects did not match the costs of borrowing 
funds from abroad.  
The sustained high investment rates and subsequent overheating pressures were also 
fuelled by the maintenance of fixed exchange rate regimes. These offered implicit 
guarantees of exchange value and, through this effect, improved external access to 
especially short-term foreign-currency denominated funds. The consequent excessive 
exposure to foreign exchange risk increased the susceptibility of economies to external 
shocks. Next to these effects, the operation of fixed exchange rate regimes magnified the 
fragility of the Asian economies to adverse terms of trade shocks and to the consequent loss 
in external competitiveness as of the second half of 1995. Because most Asian countries 
were open to and interdependent with each other, adverse foreign demand shocks and 
terms of trade shocks had a pronounced negative effect on the performance of Asian 
economies in the second half of the 1990s. The external and domestic shocks revealed the 
fragility of the Asian countries that ultimately induced the eruption of the crisis in Thailand 
and through trade and financial linkages the subsequent collapse of other countries. 
Results of our estimations as gathered in tables 2 (panel B) and 3 support this 
analysis. Trade and funds competition both exhibit a statistically significant explanation of 
the transmission of the Asian crisis in the univariate as well as the multivariate models. Some 
of the measures of banking sector strength explain crisis transmission univariately, but also 
correlate strongly with trade and funds competition so that they fail to add explanatory 
power in the multivariate models. Similar to the transmission of the Mexican crisis, the Asian 
crisis also transmits to countries broadly in accordance with patterns of trade and funds 
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competition (cf. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). In addition, there is ample evidence in 
panel B of table 2 to support the view that Bahtulism spread to countries where the banking 
sector tended to have over-expanded its credit to the private sector, while at the same time 
seeming to have been more vulnerable to changes in the exchange rate. In particular, the 
table shows that bank assets relative to GDP was some fifteen percentage points higher in 
the crisis countries in comparison with the non-crisis countries. A similar result is obtained 
for private credit provision by banks. Sensitivity to exchange rate changes follows from the 
considerably higher foreign assets price risk for crisis countries, reflecting that the banking 
sectors in these countries were heavy net borrowers in foreign currency prior to the Asian 
crisis. Strikingly, the banking sectors in crisis countries also appear more efficient than their 
counterparts in non-crisis countries, as follows from the comparison of overhead costs. As 
Bongini et al. (2001) suggest, however, this may also reflect prior forbearance from 
prudential regulations by supervisors at the onset of the Asian crisis and contribute to the 
view of the crisis transmitting to countries with over exposed banking sectors. In line with a 
camouflaged weakness of the banking sector, we find that of the miscellaneous 
macroeconomic controls, the short-term interest rate tended to be lower in crisis countries 
prior to the collapse of the Thai Baht. This feature quickly disappeared when markets 
brought down the Thai currency. 
 
The Russian crisis  
The Russian crisis started on August 18, 1998 after the collapse of the Russian Ruble. 
Several studies have attempted to understand this event. Among them, Sutela (2000) 
stresses the large amount of government securities before the crisis, leading to a fragile 
situation in financial markets. The role of the Russian banking system in the collapse of the 
Russian Ruble is non negligible as the banks were important buyers of ruble denominated 
government securities.22  
The situation of the Russian banking sector is thus quite weak before and after the 
1998 crisis.  In addition, with the Russian crisis erupting hardly more than a year after the 
Asian crisis, it may find many countries more sensitive to contagious effects than they were 
on the eve of the previous two crises. This may account for the fact that the Russian crisis 
tends to spread more across different regions (see table A1 in the appendix). It turns out 
that – as in the Mexican and Asian crises – the Russian crisis spreads via the trade channel 
(see the univariate results in panel C of table 2). Nevertheless, in contrast to the Mexican 
and Asian crisis, the funds competition channel does not appear to play a significant role. As 
                                        
22 In 1997, 30% of banks’ revenues was earned on these securities. 
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before, we do find that patterns of banking sector strength can explain which countries 
suffered from the Russian crises, but the channel appears slightly different from both crises 
discussed before. Specifically, the Russian crisis did not spread, as did the Mexican crisis, to 
those countries that exhibited a boom in bank lending. Similarly, the crisis did not spread to 
countries whose banking sectors are overexposed to currency realignments, as tended to be 
the case in the Asian crisis. Rather, the Russian crisis infected those countries where the 
banking sectors exhibited inefficiencies, as indicated by higher overhead costs. Contrary to 
the Mexican and Asian crises, overhead costs now have significant explanatory power in the 
univariate as well as the multivariate models. The risks attached to inefficiencies in the 
banking sectors are also reflected in higher short-term interest rates in the crisis countries 
many months in advance of the crisis, demonstrating that in this instance at least, markets 
were not caught unawares. Of course, DeYoung and Whalen (1994), at the level of individual 
banks, show that weak banks may display operating inefficiencies as far as six years prior to 
actual failure. In that regard, inefficiencies at the level of the banking sector may be 
identified by financial markets well in advance of a crisis. The international risk premia 
applying to countries that would subsequently suffer the contagious effects of the Russian 
crisis are also reflected by the fact that the banking sectors in these countries tended to 
have on average higher interest rate margins than their counterparts in non-crisis countries. 
 Our results for the transmission of the Russian crisis underscores the main argument 
of this paper, namely that the strength of a country’s banking sector provides an 
understanding of the vulnerability of this country to suffer from the contagious effects of 
currency crises abroad. Moreover, it does so after controlling for trade and financial linkages, 
which the economic literature on the topic by now regards as the standard channels through 
which currency crises spread from one country to another.23 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
This paper demonstrates that banking sector strength can help explain the transmission of 
the Mexican, Thai, and Russian crises. The various aspects, that jointly comprise banking 
sector strength, make it a factor that is hard to capture by a single variable, so that we 
include a number of macro-economic measures that are theoretically connected to banking 
sector strength. Given the many aspects of banking sector strength, the results are not 
surprising in the sense that they show that its role in the transmission of crises changes over 
                                        
23 Possibly we benefit from the fact that the Russian crisis spread more across regions, which allows 
for a richer specification of the transmission process than along the lines of such predominantly 
regional patterns such as trade and funds competition (cf. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). 
 17 
time. Specifically, the Mexican crisis spreads to countries with fast growth of domestic credit 
and with a stronger presence of foreign banks in the provision of domestic credits. The Thai 
crisis is also transmitted to those countries whose banking credits grew rapidly, but 
additionally to those countries that also exhibited stronger exposure to currency 
realignments. The Russian crisis, by contrast, spread predominantly to countries that 
displayed inefficiencies in their banking sectors in the form of higher overhead costs. 
 We also find that our measures of banking sector strength are highly correlated with 
trade and financia l linkages, especially so in Asia where an independent role of banking 
sector strength is hard to detect once trade and financial linkages are controlled for. The 
transmission of the Russian crisis is a notable exception as in this case banking sector 
strength explains the transmission of the crisis even after controlling for trade and financial 
linkages. The Russian crisis also seems to have diffused relatively more across regions, 
yielding a higher degree of diversity of crisis countries and allowing for a richer analysis of 
crisis transmission. 
The role of the banking sector in the transmission of crises deserves closer attention 
especially because our measurement of banking sector strength at the macro-economic level 
cannot be precise. Analysis of micro-data, specifically on (the distribution of) nonperforming 
loans in the banking sector, should yield considerably more precise measures of banking 
sector strength. However, micro-data on banks in developing countries only start to become 
available around the time of the Russian crisis. In that regard, our preliminary results on the 
independent role of the banking sector in crisis transmission in the Russian case are 
particularly encouraging for further research. 
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Table 1 Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A Mexican crisis (December 20, 1994) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) 1.00              
(2) 0.67 1.00             
(3) -0.09 0.12 1.00            
(4) -0.25 0.06 0.77 1.00           
(5) -0.13 0.22 0.67 0.83 1.00          
(6) -0.10 0.01 0.49 0.72 0.73 1.00         
(7) 0.17 0.16 -0.28 -0.58 -0.52 -0.42 1.00        
(8) -0.06 0.03 -0.23 -0.46 -0.44 -0.33 0.75 1.00       
(9) 0.02 0.06 0.39 0.70 0.71 0.82 -0.53 -0.40 1.00      
(10) 0.01 -0.08 0.09 -0.06 -0.22 -0.33 0.28 0.41 -0.11 1.00     
(11) 0.05 -0.17 -0.38 -0.38 -0.37 -0.21 0.23 0.12 -0.13 0.07 1.00    
(12) -0.02 0.09 0.08 0.19 -0.10 0.08 -0.19 0.15 0.38 -0.09 0.04 1.00   
(13) 0.01 0.00 0.33 0.43 -0.01 0.23 -0.15 -0.28 0.33 -0.06 -0.17 0.25 1.00  
(14) 0.27 0.34 -0.14 0.02 0.13 0.03 0.19 -0.16 -0.12 -0.27 -0.08 0.10 0.16 1.00 
 
Panel B Asian crisis (July 2, 1997) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) 1.00              
(2) 0.56 1.00             
(3) 0.10 0.32 1.00            
(4) 0.22 0.37 0.82 1.00           
(5) 0.30 0.43 0.78 0.93 1.00          
(6) 0.12 0.22 0.60 0.79 0.77 1.00         
(7) -0.30 -0.34 -0.58 -0.69 -0.69 -0.46 1.00        
(8) -0.13 -0.19 -0.48 -0.60 -0.53 -0.40 0.85 1.00       
(9) 0.45 0.54 0.48 0.75 0.81 0.79 -0.63 -0.55 1.00      
(10) -0.12 -0.19 -0.11 -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 0.09 0.12 -0.19 1.00     
(11) -0.11 -0.27 -0.32 -0.34 -0.36 -0.21 0.19 0.14 -0.19 -0.14 1.00    
(12) 0.18 0.19 0.30 0.54 0.57 0.87 -0.18 -0.14 0.69 -0.21 -0.17 1.00   
(13) 0.29 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.10 -0.29 -0.15 0.31 0.11 0.01 0.04 1.00  
(14) 0.17 0.29 -0.05 0.03 0.17 0.04 -0.09 -0.01 0.27 -0.24 -0.11 0.18 0.40 1.00 
 
Panel C Russian crisis (August 18, 1998) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) 1.00              
(2) 0.22 1.00             
(3) -0.49 0.23 1.00            
(4) -0.37 0.28 0.83 1.00           
(5) -0.41 0.34 0.83 0.95 1.00          
(6) -0.40 0.09 0.68 0.85 0.82 1.00         
(7) 0.32 -0.20 -0.60 -0.61 -0.61 -0.40 1.00        
(8) 0.26 -0.02 -0.52 -0.60 -0.56 -0.49 0.79 1.00       
(9) -0.24 0.39 0.57 0.79 0.84 0.81 -0.55 -0.48 1.00      
(10) 0.35 0.10 -0.14 -0.27 -0.28 -0.28 -0.02 0.13 -0.26 1.00     
(11) 0.04 -0.34 -0.30 -0.31 -0.32 -0.17 0.22 0.20 -0.08 0.01 1.00    
(12) -0.18 0.13 0.32 0.56 0.57 0.78 0.01 -0.14 0.66 -0.26 -0.20 1.00   
(13) -0.06 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.15 0.06 -0.35 -0.14 0.16 0.11 0.06 -0.03 1.00  
(14) 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.09 0.17 0.12 -0.34 -0.10 0.33 -0.01 -0.03 0.05 0.40 1.00 
 
Note, Funds Competition (1), Trade Competition (2), Domestic credit provided by banks (3), Bank assets to GDP 
(4), Private credit by banks (5), Deposits by banks (6), Overhead costs (7), Net interest margin (8), Claims on the 
private sector (9), Claims on the government (10), Bank liquid reserves to assets (11), Foreign bank penetration 
(12), Foreign assets price risk (13), Lending boom (14). 
 19 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics per crisis 
Country mean values  Z-statistic in probit model1  # Obs. 
Crisis Non-crisis  Univariate Multivariate2 
Panel A Mexican crisis (December 20, 1994) 
Funds competition 
Trade competition 
Bank assets to GDP 
Private credit by banks 
Deposits by banks 
Overhead costs 
Net interest margin 
Claims on the private sector 
Claims on the government 
Domestic credit provided by banks 
Bank liquid reserves to assets 
Lending boom 
Foreign bank penetration 
Foreign assets price risk 
 
48 
47 
42 
42 
44 
41 
37 
22 
22 
47 
46 
33 
47 
41 
0.67 
0.04 
0.50 
0.45 
0.64 
0.06 
0.07 
0.48 
0.05 
0.74 
0.12 
0.89 
0.04 
0.31 
0.47 
0.02 
0.44 
0.32 
0.36 
0.04 
0.06 
0.35 
0.11 
0.62 
0.16 
0.22 
0.01 
0.23 
 2.22*** 
3.09*** 
0.45 
1.16 
1.34* 
1.21 
0.55 
0.84 
-1.00 
0.71 
-1.01 
2.16*** 
1.79** 
0.00 
- 
- 
0.39 
0.77 
1.37* 
0.69 
0.40 
1.03 
-1.20 
0.56 
-0.70 
1.53* 
1.66** 
-0.04 
Panel B Asian crisis (July 2, 1997) 
Funds competition 
Trade competition 
Bank assets to GDP 
Private credit by banks 
Deposits by banks 
Overhead costs 
Net interest margin 
Claims on the private sector 
Claims on the government 
Domestic credit provided by banks 
Bank liquid reserves to assets 
Lending boom 
Foreign bank penetration 
Foreign assets price risk 
 
48 
47 
47 
46 
47 
47 
45 
27 
27 
47 
46 
42 
48 
47 
0.57 
0.15 
0.54 
0.46 
0.38 
0.04 
0.05 
0.36 
0.10 
0.69 
0.11 
0.54 
0.02 
0.06 
0.41 
0.04 
0.39 
0.31 
0.36 
0.05 
0.06 
0.21 
0.06 
0.54 
0.14 
0.37 
0.01 
-0.11 
 2.78*** 
3.05*** 
1.68** 
1.80** 
0.24 
-1.70** 
-1.32* 
0.68 
0.66 
0.92 
-0.79 
0.86 
1.48* 
1.98*** 
- 
- 
0.61 
0.45 
0.04 
-0.42 
-0.81 
-0.53 
0.66 
0.22 
-0.20 
-0.42 
0.96 
0.61 
Panel C Russian crisis (August 18, 1998) 
Funds competition 
Trade competition 
Bank assets to GDP 
Private credit by banks 
Deposits by banks 
Overhead costs 
Net interest margin 
Claims on the private sector 
Claims on the government 
Domestic credit provided by banks 
Bank liquid reserves to assets 
Lending boom 
Foreign bank penetration 
Foreign assets price risk 
48 
47 
47 
47 
47 
48 
46 
28 
28 
47 
46 
43 
48 
45 
0.57 
0.05 
0.50 
0.45 
0.47 
0.05 
0.07 
0.46 
0.03 
0.61 
0.09 
0.36 
0.09 
-0.00 
0.56 
0.03 
0.48 
0.39 
0.40 
0.04 
0.05 
0.41 
0.09 
0.66 
0.12 
0.53 
0.01 
-0.05 
 -0.32 
2.21*** 
0.15 
0.57 
0.65 
1.45* 
1.38* 
0.28 
-1.39* 
-0.33 
-1.07 
-0.98 
0.55 
0.44 
- 
- 
-1.06 
-0.79 
0.10 
2.42*** 
1.79** 
-0.72 
-1.51* 
-1.56* 
-0.35 
-1.39* 
0.64 
-0.02 
Notes: Lending boom is defined as the four-year percentage change in the ratio of the size of the claims 
on the banking sector (demand deposit banks and monetary authorities) on the private sector to GDP 
(cf. Sachs et al., 1996). 
1 Significance at the 20, 10, and 5 percent error level is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
2 The multivariate results evaluate the additional explanatory power of the respective variable in a 
model that already incorporates trade and funds competition. 
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Table 3 Multivariate analysis 
Variable 
Mexican Crisis 
(December 20, 1994) 
____________________ 
Asian Crisis 
(July 2, 1997) 
___________ 
Russian Crisis 
(August 18, 1998) 
____________________ 
Constant -2.140*** 
(-2.835) 
-2.770*** 
(-2.920) 
-2.432*** 
(-2.742) 
-0.286 
(-0.375) 
-1.020 
(-1.123) 
Funds competition 0.005 
(0.316) 
0.012 
(0.611) 
0.024* 
(1.317) 
-0.012 
(-0.891) 
-0.030** 
(-1.829) 
Trade competition 0.446*** 
(2.069) 
0.361** 
(1.671) 
0.102*** 
(2.587) 
0.155*** 
(2.340) 
0.284*** 
(3.115) 
Foreign bank penetration  0.119** 
(1.660) 
   
Overhead costs     0.142 
(1.177) 
Short-term interest rate     0.032* 
(1.549) 
McFadden R-squared 0.240 0.329 0.332 0.094 0.302 
Observations 47 46 46 47 44 
LR Statistic 11.040*** 13.975*** 18.164*** 5.867** 17.997*** 
Notes: Probit estimates of our binary crisis variables (as defined by Glick and Rose, 1999 
and Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001) with Z-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 
20, 10, and 5 percent error level is indicated by *, ** and ***, respectively. 
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Appendix. Variable Description 
 
Crisis Indicator 
 
Table A1 Crisis (1) and non-crisis (0) countries 
 Mexican crisis Asian crisis Russian crisis 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Czech Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt 
Ghana 
Greece 
Hong Kong 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malaysia 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Morocco 
Nigeria 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Portugal 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Zimbabwe 
Japan 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Bulgaria 
Estonia 
Slovenia 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
- 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
1 
0 
- 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
- 
0 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Source: Glick and Rose (1999) and Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001). Glick and Rose rely on The 
Financial Times reports mainly to identify the victims of the transmission of the Mexican and Asian 
crisis. Van Rijckeghem and Weder construct an analogous crisis indicator based on the views of IMF 
economists to determine if a country suffered from contagion in the wake of the Russian crisis. 
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Trade Indicator 
The definition of the trade variable follows Glick and Rose (1999), who define trade 
competition as the share of exports to a common destination k according to 
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where 0,ik ¹ . The variables xi. and x0. denote aggregate exports from country i and ground 
zero, respectively. xik and x0k represent exports from country i and ground zero to country k. 
The first component on the right-hand-side depicts the importance of country k as an export 
destination for country i and the ground zero country relative to aggregate exports of 
country i and ground zero. The second term denotes the relative importance of country k as 
anexporting destination of ground zero and country i and, hence, the extent to which both 
countries compete to export to country k. A high value of this index points to a high degree 
of competition between ground zero and country i in third markets.  
 
Finance Indicator 
Following Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001), the measure of competition for funds in third 
markets applies the measure of trade competition in shares (A3) to flows of international 
bank loans. In this application xok and x ik now represent bank loans from country k to ground 
zero and country 1, respectively, while x0. and xi. denote total bank loans to ground zero and 
country i. A high value of the funds competition measure suggests strong competition 
between country i and the ground zero country for bank loans from the same third markets.  
 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
The internal and external balance can be approximated by a multitude of economic 
variables.24 We include the pre-crisis current account deficit, the pre-crisis ratio of domestic 
liquidity to international reserves, real GDP growth, the government budget deficit as a 
percentage of GDP, growth of credit to the private sector, the ratio of short-term debt to 
international reserves, and the short-term interest rate as measure of financial market 
pressure. Furthermore, we incorporate the pre-crisis rate of real appreciation. Ideally, the 
degree of exchange rate under-valuation should be measured using a trade-weighted index 
of real exchange rates (e.g. Van Rijckeghem and Weder, 2001). Because real effective 
                                        
24 Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) include 18 financial and macroeconomic time series. Details are in 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Kaminsky (1998). 
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exchange rate data are only available for a small sample of countries, the present analysis 
approximates the under-valuation of the currency by means of the bilateral real exchange 
rate defined in terms of U.S. dollars. Since the bilateral and effective real exchange rate are 
strongly correlated for those countries for which both measures are available, the empirical 
results are not expected to depend on our alternative definition of the real exchange rate. 
 
Banking Indicator 
The following table summarizes the definition of the measures of banking sector strength 
and the corresponding data sources. 
 
Table A2 Defining banking sector strength 
Variable Definition  Source 
Bank assets to GDP  
Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector 
by deposit money banks as a share of GDP. 
Private credit by banks 
Private credit by deposit money banks as a 
share of GDP. 
Deposits by banks Demand, time, and saving deposits in deposit money banks as a share of GDP. 
Overhead costs Accounting value of a bank's overhead costs as a share of its total assets. 
Net interest margin 
Accounting value of bank's net interest 
revenue as a share of its interest -bearing 
(total earning) assets. 
Worldbank (see 
www.worldbank.org/research
/projects/finstructure/databas
e.htm) 
Claims on the private sector Claims on the private sector as a share of GDP. 
Claims on the government  Claims on the government and other public entities as share of GDP. 
Domestic credit provided by banks Domestic credit provided by banks as a share 
of GDP. 
Bank liquid reserves to assets Bank liquid reserves to bank asset ratio. 
World Development 
Indicators by the Worldbank 
Lending boom index 
The real percentage change in loans that 
banks grant to the private sector and to 
state-owned enterprises over a four-year pre-
crisis period. 
Total domestic credit (IFS line 
32) minus government claims 
(IFS line 32an) divided by the 
CPI (IFS line 64) (see Tornell, 
1999). The four-year growth 
rate is computed on an 
annual, quarterly, and 
monthly basis. The quarterly 
and monthly measures 
provide rankings of countries 
in 1994 similar to Sachs et al. 
(1996). 
Foreign bank penetration 
Combination of BIS data on consolidated 
international bank claims and Bankscope data 
on lending by foreign bank subsidiaries and 
domestic banks. 
De Haas and Van Lelyveld 
(2004) 
Foreign asset price risk 
Deposit money banks’ (DMB) foreign liabilities 
minus DMB’s foreign assets over DMB’s 
claims on the private sector. 
IMF International Financial 
Statistics (code 21326C, 
21321, 21322D) 
 
